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FEDERAL INDIAN LAW
Under What Circumstances, If Any,
Do Indian Tribal Courts Have Civil
Jurisdiction over Non-Indians?
by ltthew L. M. Fletcher
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This is the first federal Indian law
case in which the Supreme Court
featuring Chief Justice Roberts and
Justice Alito has granted certiorari
and thus provides the first chance
to see how the newest justices view
Indian law.
ISSTES
May a tribal court exercise subject
matter jurisdiction over nonmembers
that engage in on-reservation coni-
mercial activities with tribal mem-
bers and who are alleged to engaged
in discriminatory conduct arising out
of the commercial activities?
Does a petitioner have standing in
federal court to challenge a tribal
court's jurisdiction over a question
on which the petitioner prevailed
before the tribal court?
Matthew L. M. Fletcher is an
assistant professor at Michigan
State University College of Law
and director of the Indigenous Law
and Policy Center. lie is co-author
of the forthcoming sixth edition of
Cases and Materials on Federal
Indian Law (Thomson West) and
an enrolled member of the Grand
Traverse Band of Ottawa and
Chippewa Indians. Professor
Fletcher can be reached at
matthew.fleteher@law.msu.edu
or (517) 432-6909.
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FACTS
The Long Family Land and Cattle
Company is a family farming and
ranching business located on fee
lands within the Cheyenne River
Sioux Indian Reservation, South
Dakota, incorporated under the laws
of the State of South Dakota. At
least 51 percent of the Long
Company is Indian-owned, allowing
the company to receive loan guaran-
tees from the Bureau of Indian
Affairs. Plains Commerce Bank, for-
merlv the Bank of Iloven, lent capi-
tal and operating funds to the Long
Company.
In 1996, after negotiations at the
tribal offices, and with federal gov-
ernment assistance, the parties
entered into a new loan arrange-
ment in which the Long Company
deeded its land to the bank for two
years in exchange for the canceling
of certain debts and the promise of
future operations loans. At the expi-
ration of the term, the Long
Company could repurchase the land
by settling its entire debt. The Long
Company alleged before a tribal
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In a ease arising on the
Cheyenne River Sioux
Tribe's reservation in
South Dakota, an Indian
tribal member-owned
company stied a
nonmember-owned bank
in tribal court to prevent
the foreelosure and sale
of its ranching land and
to assert contract and
discrimination claims.
This ease provides the
Court an opportunity to
clarify the extent to
which a tribal court may
exercise subject matter
jurisdiction over non-
member defendants in
accordance with Montana
v. United States, 450 U.S.
544 (1981).
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court jury that the bank initially
offered a 20-year mortgage but
backed out, citing the jurisdictional
problem of lending to Indian-owned
businesses in Indian Country. In the
winter of 1996-97, the Long
Company endured horrific cold
weather in which most of its cattle
herd perished after the bank refused
to lend the company funds for oper-
ating costs during the period. After
this time, the company could not
settle its debt to the bank and
repurchase its land.
In 1998, the bank initiated state
court eviction proceedings against
the Long Company and sold much
of the land to others. The Long
Company brought suit in the
Cheyenne River Sioux tribal court,
seeking an injunction preventing
the sale and foreclosure. The tribal
court denied the motion. The com-
pany then amended its complaint to
add contract claims and a discrimi-
nation claim. The company sought a
jury trial that by tribal court rule
could have required a jury pool
including nonmembers, while the
bank did not. The jury verdict came
in favoring the Long Company on
the contract claim, but not the dis-
erimination claim, assessing
$750,000 plus interest in damages.
Plains Commerce Bank then initiat-
ed a federal court action in accor-
dance with National Farmers Union
v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845 (1985),
seeking an injunction against the
tribal court on the grounds that
the court lacked jurisdiction over
nonmembers. The district court
rejected the claim, and the Eighth
Circuit affirmed.
CASE ANALYSIS
The ease involves the application of
the general rule, announced by the
Supreme Court in Montana V.
United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981),
that Indian tribes do not have civil
regulatory or adjudicatory jurisdie-
tion over nonmembers, unless one
of two exceptions is met. The first
exception, most relevant here, is
that a tribe may exercise jurisdic-
tion over a nonmember that engages
in on-reservation consensual com-
mercial relations with the tribe or
its members. The second exception
is that a tribe may exercise jurisdic-
tion wx hen the conduct of the non-
member has a significant impact on
the political integrity, economic
security, or health and welfare of
the tribe. With the arguable excep-
tion of a 1983 Indian taxation case,
the Court has not invoked either
exception. In two cases, however,
the Court has noted in dicta that
tribal courts might have presump-
tive authority to assert civil jurisdic-
tion over nonmembers for conduct
that occurs on reservation lands.
Plains Commerce Bank asserts first
that the Supreme Court should hold
that neither of the two exceptions
apply in this matter. The bank
argues that the tribal court asser-
tions of jurisdiction are strongest
when the nonmember conduct
occurs on Indian reservation land,
and that the Long Company land
is not reservation land. The bank
further asserts that the Long
Company is not in fact an "Indian"
for purposes of tribal court jurisdie-
tion because the company is incor-
porated under state law. Nine states
(jointly), the American Bankers
Association, and the Association of
American Railroads each filed ami-
eus briefs arguing that the Court
should adopt a much stricter "con-
sensual relations" test than that
applied by the lower courts in this
matter.
The bank also argues that the Court
should hold that tribal courts may
never exercise jurisdiction over
nonmembers, eliminating the
exceptions to the general rule in
Montana v. United States. The bank
argues that forcing nonmembers
into tribal courts subjects them to
unfair laws and procedures, espe-
cially customary laws. Amicus briefs
filed by three counties jointly and
the Mountain States Legal
Foundation supported the bank's
position on this point.
Long Family Land and Cattle
Company argues first that the bank
does not have standing in federal
court to bring a jurisdiction chal-
lenge on the discrimination claim
because the bank prevailed before
the tribal court jury on that claim
and awarded damages on the con-
tract claim alone. According to the
company, the bank waived its chal-
lenge to the tribal court's jurisdic-
tion over the contract claims in the
courts below. As a result, the com-
pany argues, the Supreme Court
should either dismiss the certiorari
petition as improvidently granted or
affirm the judgment on independent
contract grounds.
On the merits, the company asserts
that the transaction complained of
meets the first Montana exception
in that the bank consensually
engaged in a long-term, on-
reservation business relationship
with an Indian company. The com-
pany argues that its "indian" char-
acter is proven by the fact that the
Bureau of Indian Affairs required
Indian ownership in order to pro-
vide loan guarantees over the vari-
ous loans made by the bank to the
company. The company further
argues that the bank had the oppor-
tunity to seek a tribal court jury
consisting in part of nonmembers
but reftsed to do so. Amicus briefs
filed by the United States and the
National Congress of American
Indians supported the company's
argument that the bank's conduct
brought it within the first Montana
exception.
Amicus briefs filed by the Cheyenne
River Sioux Tribe and the National
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American Indian Court Judges
Association, as well as the brief filed
by the federal government, support-
ed the company's claim that tribal
courts are fair to nonmembers and
competent to adjudicate complex
claims. A final amicus brief filed by
the National Network to End
Domestic Violence argued that cur-
tailing tribal court jurisdiction over
nonmembers may undermine efforts
to prevent nonmember domestic
violence within Indian Country by
limiting tribal courts' authority to
use civil remedies against nonmem-
ber domestic violence offenders.
SIGNIFICANCE
The major significance of Plains
Commeree Bank v. Long Family
Lund and Cattle Co. turns on
whether the Supreme Court, assum-
ing it rules in favor of the petitioner,
will use this case as a vehicle to
hold that Indian tribes and tribal
courts are automatically barred
from asserting any form of civil
jurisdiction over nonmembers. The
Court has held in no fewer than
four major eases since 1993 that the
asserted jurisdiction by Indian
tribes or tribal courts over nonmem-
bers did not meet one of the two
Montana exceptions. In a previous
case involving tribal criminal juris-
diction, Oliphant v. Suquamish
Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978),
the Court held that Indian tribes
may never prosecute nonmembers,
although Congress legislated away a
portion of that decision involving
the category of nonmember Indians.
See United StaItes v. Lara, 541 U.S.
183 (2004).
The loss of all forms of civil jurisdic-
tion over nonmembers would be a
considerable blow to tribal gover-
nance and business activities. Tribes
already enter into numerous busi-
ness and intergovernmental rela-
tionships with nonmembers and
nonmember governments that allow
for exclusive or shared civil authori-
ty over nonmembers, all of which
would become suspect. These agree-
ments include gaming management
contracts, land lease arrangements,
law enforcement and public safety
cross-deputization agreements, tax
collection and revenue sharing
agreements, and many other forms
of negotiated agreements. State and
tribal court cooperation and recip-
rocal comity may decline if the
Court concludes that tribal court
procedures and tribal laws are pre-
sumptively unfair to nonmembers.
Moreover, as the amici for the
respondent assert, the authority of
tribes and tribal courts to exercise
jurisdiction to prevent and remedy
domestic violence and other non-
member civil torts might be jeopar-
dized. More likely than not, tribal
interests would actively seek assis-
tance from Congress in overturning
at least some aspects of the ruling
via legislation.
However, a ruling that merely favors
Plains Commerce Bank, reverses the
lower courts, and holds that the
Cheyenne River Sioux tribal court
did not have jurisdiction in this par-
ticular ease might not have a great
deal of significance. Still, such a rul-
ing, keeping open the possibility
that nonmembers could expressly
consent to tribal civil jurisdiction,
would require tribes to acquire writ-
ten and specific proof of nonmem-
ber consent to tribal jurisdiction.
The bargaining power of tribal inter-
ests in negotiating with nonmem-
bers in this context would almost
certainly decline.
A ruling favoring the respondent
and affirming the lower courts on
the merits would be the first time
the Supreme Court has invoked one
of the two Montana exceptions. The
significance of that outeole might
be muted by the particular facts of
the tribal court adjudication in this
ease. The Court could focus on the
fact that the bank could have
requested a jury trial that featured a
jury pool including nonmembers,
and that in this case the trial judge
and two-thirds of the tribal appellate
court were nonmembers. The Court
could then hold that future asser-
tions of tribal court jurisdiction
must also feature procedural safe-
guards for nonmembers along those
lines. Many tribal courts do not
guarantee jury trials in civil matters,
let alone jury trials featuring a jury
pool including nonmelnbers.
A ruling reaffirming and perhaps
clarifying the Montana general rule
and its exceptions to the benefit of
tribal interests will likely portend
more persistent attempts by Indian
tribes and businesses to exercise
jurisdiction over nonmember busi-
ness activities and property and to
exercise increasing taxing authority
over nonmembers. Tribal courts
likely will be encouraged to assert
civil jurisdiction over a greater num-
ber of cases involving nonmelber
defendants. Such a ruling may also
lead to future cases in which 1on-
members assert due process, equal
protection, and takings claims,
among other foundational constitu-
tional claims, that question the very
sovereignty of Indian tribes in the
American constitutional structure.
Finally, the Supreme Court could
hold that the petition for certiorari
was improvidently granted, render-
ing moot the entire question and
leaving the underlying question
open for yet amother case.
ATTORNEYS FOR TIlE
PARTIES
For Petitioner Plains Commerce
Bank (Paul Anthony Banker (612)
371-3969)
For Respondent Long Family Land
and Cattle Coinpany, Inc., et al.
(David C. Frederick (202) 326-
7951)
(Continned on Pac 332)
American Bar Association
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AMICUS BRIEFS
In Support of Petitioner Plains
Commerce Bank
American Bankers Association,
et al. (Brett M. Kocnecke (605) 224-
8803)
Association of American
Railroads (Lynn It. Slade (505) 848-
1800)
Idaho et al. (Clay R. Smith (208)
334-2400)
Idaho County and Lewis Count\,
Idaho, and Cass County and
Mahuornen County, Minnesota
(Scott Gregory Knudson (612) 977-
8400)
Mountain States Legal
Foundation (,1. Scott Detamore
(303) 292-2021)
In Support of Respondent Long
Family Land and Cattle Company,
Inc., et al.
Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe
(Mark I. Levy (202) 824-1437)
National American Indian Court
Judges Association et al. (William R.
Stein (202) 721-4600)
National Congress of American
Indians et al. (Virginia A. Seitz
(202) 736-8000)
National Network to End
Domestic Violence et al. (Fernando
R. Laguarda (2{)2) 730-1300)
United States (Paul 1). Clement,
Solicitor General (202) 514-2217)
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